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Abstract 
In online networks, the polarization of opinions (e.g., 
regarding presidential elections or referenda) has been 
associated with the creation of “echo-chambers” of like-
minded peers, secluded from those of contrary viewpoints. 
Previous work has commonly attributed such phenomena to 
self-regarding preferences (e.g., confirmation bias), individual 
differences, and the pre-dispositions of users, with clusters 
forming over repeated interactions. 
The present work provides a proof of concept Agent-Based 
Model that demonstrates online networks are susceptible to 
echo-chambers from a single opinion cascade, due to the 
spatiotemporal order induced by lateral transmission. This 
susceptibility is found to vary as a function of degree of 
interconnectivity and opinion strength. Critically, such effects 
are found despite globally proportionate levels of opinions, 
equally rational agents (i.e. absent conformity, confirmation 
bias or pre-disposition architecture), and prior to cyclical 
interactions.  
The assumptions and implications of this work, including the 
value of Agent-Based Modelling to cognitive psychology, are 
discussed. 
Keywords: Information cascades; opinion dynamics; belief 
updating; Agent-Based Models 
Introduction 
As online networks, such as social media, have developed 
and increased in popularity, research regarding the spread of 
false information, the polarization of opinions (Dandekar, 
Goel, & Lee, 2013), and echo-chamber phenomena (Del et 
al., 2016) have become increasingly pertinent topics. Such 
phenomena pose a problem to society, and democracy as a 
whole, given the average user’s exposure to only the 
information and opinions of their local (i.e. direct) network, 
leading to a break-down in informed debate and consensus. 
Recently, questions regarding how individuals on a 
network receive new information and form or adopt 
opinions has come to the fore. Whether on topics of national 
referenda, deciding between presidential candidates, or 
interpreting news events (e.g., who is at fault in the 
annexation of Crimea, the shooting down of passenger 
aircraft, the political correctness of a reported comment or 
behavior), it has become more and more common for such 
information to be ascertained via social media
1
. In this way, 
an agent’s source of information comes through a filter of 
network-acquaintances, presenting an unprecedented degree 
                                                          
1 In 2016 a PewResearch poll found the majority (62%) of US 
adults get their news through social media. Source: 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-
media-platforms-2016/  
of lateral, peer-to-peer dissemination of information. Such 
peer-to-peer transference of information, in a time where the 
information itself (whether “fake news”, political memes, or 
posted opinion) carries a bias in its view of the world, 
presents a problem that psychology and multi-agent 
modelling is well-placed to answer. 
The purpose of the present paper is two-fold: Firstly, this 
work provides a novel demonstration of the dangers of 
lateral propagation of opinions in online networks, based 
solely on the level of interconnectivity and the inherent way 
in which interpreted events (i.e. opinions) travel through 
them. This results in high levels of false consensuses and 
echo-chambers on a local level within the network. 
Critically, such localized clustering is shown to occur before 
any repeated interaction behaviors, and is robust to both 
different opinion strengths and propensities to communicate. 
Secondly, this work presents an argument that cognitive 
science is readily placed to lend insight into these 
interactive, societal level phenomena, and the super-
aggregate behaviors. Such insight can be lent by the ready 
application of cognitive models taken from individual-based 
empirical work and theory, to multi-agent simulations, 
known as Agent-Based Models (ABMs), so as to uncover 
and explain phenomena beyond the scope of individual-
based experiments. 
Cascades and Opinions 
How information is communicated between individuals on a 
societal (or multi-agent) scale, and its consequences, has 
been formally approached in two main areas; information 
cascades and opinion dynamics. 
Research in information cascades has focused on the way 
in which information is spread through a system. This has 
included how networks may be resistant to cascading 
influence, such as the spread of cultural fads (Watts, 2002). 
Such work has typically characterized “information” as a 
singular, memetic entity that is propagated or hindered by 
either the properties of individuals within the network (such 
as the proportion of “easily influenced individuals”, see 
Watts & Dodds, 2007), or the structure of the network itself 
(e.g., hierarchical influencers; see Watts, 2002). This work 
has illustrated power law effects in information propagation 
across networks, an effect akin to percolation theory in 
physics (for a review, see Essam, 1980), wherein the 
clustered structure of a system leads to a critical singularity 
event (i.e. cascade). These cascades result in cluster size 
distribution effects, where smaller, more numerous clusters 
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occur as systems become more interconnected (Amar & 
Family, 1995; Meakin, Vicsek, & Family, 1985). 
Research in opinion dynamics has instead focused on the 
cyclical interactions of individuals within a network. In 
particular, it has looked at the ways in which individuals and 
groups interact so as to either reach a consensus (Acemoglu 
& Ozdaglar, 2011; Hegselmann & Krause, 2002) or 
segregate into polarized sub-groups of homogenous 
opinion-holders (Dandekar et al., 2013; Duggins, 2016; 
Zanette & Gil, 2006). Critically, this research has focused 
on groups of pre-existing opinion-holders. This work has 
yielded insights into belief-updating via repeated interaction 
(such as through the use of the Bounded Confidence Model; 
Deffuant, Neau, Amblard, & Weisbuch, 2000), along with 
psychologically based models of behaviors including 
network pruning (Ngampruetikorn & Stephens, 2015), 
which provides a plausible pruning mechanism of network 
contacts, based on a confirmation bias (self-regarding) 
principle. 
The present paper interweaves elements of these two lines 
of literature, in conjunction with cognitive architecture 
brought forth from models of learning and communication 
in cognitive psychology. In particular, agents are encoded 
with three pieces of cognitive machinery: attention 
(detecting the public declarations of others); learning 
(incorporating a communication into a belief-state, and 
evaluating it against evidence); and decision-making (each 
choosing whether to make their opinion public based on a 
decision rule). In this way, all agents within the network are 
equally rational. 
By focusing on universal cognitive architecture on the 
part of agents (and instead introducing stochasticity to the 
evidence against which an opinion is evaluated), this work 
argues that echo-chambers may result solely from the way 
in which networks are structured, and the spatiotemporal 
order of lateral opinion transference (i.e. an opinion 
cascade). 
The semi-random way in which networks are structured 
(my relational position to the global network is random, but 
my method of forming my proximal (direct) connections is 
rule-based (those whom I know)), runs parallel to work on 
“small-worlds” (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), which have 
shown susceptibility to cascades and synchronizability. As 
such, echo-chambers may occur without reliance on 
repeated interaction (Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 2011; Duggins, 
2016), or individual differences encoded in agents, such as 
differences in susceptibility, or pre-dispositions towards an 
opinion (Watts & Dodds, 2007) or hierarchy (see 
Quattrociocchi, Caldarelli, & Scala, 2014). 
Agent-Based Modeling 
ABMs are multi-agent, dynamic simulations which use 
combinations of three central components; agents, patches, 
and links. Agents are the individual actors within a model, 
and in the present paper, represent individuals within a 
network. Agents may be encoded cognitive rules (e.g., 
learning models), simple behaviors (e.g., signaling to 
neighboring agents, movement), and values (e.g., prior 
beliefs, physical positioning). Agents are ascribed various 
forms of heterogeneity (such as occupying different 
positions within a network), as multiple agents are generated 
within the system. As the simulation runs, agents enact 
behaviors and update their values according to the specific 
rules ascribed to them, interacting with other agents and the 
environment accordingly.  
Similarly, both links, which represent connections 
between agents, and patches, which represent the 
environment, may be encoded with behaviors and values, 
and the capacity to dynamically interact and update as the 
simulation runs. In the present paper, links are used to 
represent the connections between individuals within a 
network, and are thus used for signaling between agents. 
Given the network representation (requiring only agents and 
the links between them), the present model does not require 
the use of patches. 
ABMs have been used to explore and assess how 
behaviors on an individual level, when placed within a 
dynamic, multi-agent, heterogeneous system, can lead to 
societal level, super-aggregate behaviors (Epstein, 1999, 
2006; Schelling, 2006). For example, by encoding a 
preference in individuals to be neighbors with others who 
are similar (whether, on racial, socio-economic, or cultural 
lines), and assuming some stochasticity in signaling such 
similarity, Thomas Schelling (1971) was able to show the 
evolution of segregation on a community, and even city-
wide level. In a similar manner, the previously mentioned 
research on information cascades  and opinion dynamics 
(Duggins, 2016) has used this technique to demonstrate a 
number of phenomena, with relatively few assumptions, that 
are difficult with traditional, equation-based cognitive 
modelling. 
A Model of Opinion Cascades 
The aim of the current model is to provide a proof that the 
inherent structure of an online network is susceptible to high 
degrees of opinion segregation (i.e. false consensuses or 
echo-chambers). Critically, this segregation does not require 
repeated interaction, and can instead occur as a consequence 
of a single “cascade” across a network of rational agents 
(i.e. assuming no individual differences in cognitive 
architecture), despite equal proportions of opinion-holders 
on a global level. 
A network of agents is created whereby agents are 
randomly assigned an XY coordinate, and each outfitted 
with the cognitive architecture and values outlined below. 
Each agent then forms links with its neighbors based on 
proximity in terms of Euclidean distance – representative of 
relational proximity in online networks (see Duggins, 2016). 
The number of links agents form is manipulated, and based 
on the percentage of the total number of agents in the 
system, from .5%, to 50%. This is calculated by dividing the 
number of links per agent by the total number of agents in 
the network. Thus, given a population of 1000 agents, for an 
interconnectivity of .5%, all agents form links with their 
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nearest 5 neighbors; for 10%, the nearest 100 agents, and so 
on. Accordingly, given a fixed population size across 
simulations, interconnectivity is manipulated via the number 
of links each agent possesses. In a similar manner, a neutral 
“event” node is placed in the geographical center of the 
simulation, and connected to the nearest agents according to 
the above rules for interconnectivity. Thus, increasing 
interconnectivity beyond 50% serves no purpose, given that 
every other agent will have been exposed to the neutral 
event (i.e. is 1
st
 generation), and thus no cascade can occur 
beyond two time points. Similarly, in the current model, 
interconnectivity below .5% (i.e. 5 links per Agent) starts to 
risk fracturing the network into separate entities. 
Cognitive Architecture 
Each agent is outfitted with simple cognitive architecture 
that can be classified into three branches: attention, learning, 
and propagation. 
All agents within the network attend to their linked-
neighbors, in that they are sensitive to the first of their 
neighbors to “declare” an opinion. Having seen such a 
declaration, the agent then moves into a learning phase to 
evaluate it.  
The communicated opinion thus forms a prior for the 
evaluating agent. As mentioned previously, the opinions in 
the model are categorized into a binary division (Opinion A, 
Opinion B). Thus, from a neutral prior (.5), moving towards 
Opinion A is assigned a positive direction, whilst moving 
towards Opinion B a negative direction. In this way, a prior 
indicating Opinion A should shift the neutral recipient agent 
positively (e.g., 0.5 + 0.1 = 0.6), and negatively for Opinion 
B. The strength of this shift is accordingly manipulated as a 
proxy of opinion strength / influence. 
To represent the relationship between the strength of an 
opinion and the likelihood of a recipient adhering to that 
opinion, a learning model is used that allows agents to 
evaluate the opinion against stochastic evidence. 
Specifically, a reinforcement learning model is used 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), in which agents evaluate an 
opinion in light of new evidence, such that the prediction 
error (δ), multiplied by the learning parameter (β), is added 
to the value associated with the opinion (prior) for the 
current trial (Q(t)), leading to an updated opinion value (Q(t 
+ 1)). 
𝑄(𝑡 + 1) =  𝑄(𝑡) +  𝛽𝛿(𝑡)       (1) 
 
Such models have been adapted (with added complexity) 
successfully to model the impact of instruction in 
reinforcement learning (Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 
2009; Staudinger & Büchel, 2013) and are thus considered a 
suitable placeholder for the proof of concept model. To 
evaluate the belief, agents then experience a number of 
evidence trials (arbitrarily set to 10), where evidence values 
are binary {0, 1}, and are drawn with equal likelihood (i.e. 
P(E=1) = .5). To reiterate, the learning process herein serves 
as a representation for the relationship between prior 
strength, and its likelihood of acceptance/rejection. Thus, if 
the communicated opinion is represented by a weaker prior, 
it is more likely to be rejected by the learning / evaluation 
process. Similarly, increasing the amount of available 
evidence has the equivalent effect of converging the agent to 
the .5 (neutral) true state of the event (i.e. reducing the 
likelihood of passing on the original opinion). In this way, 
stronger opinions make the cascade more deterministic. 
Further, using a stochastic sampling process to dictate 
opinion uptake serves as a useful baseline model, to which 
complexity may be added directly to learning processes. 
Having evaluated, agents declare for one of the two 
opinions, based on a decision rule: if Q(posterior) > .5, hold 
Opinion A; if < .5, hold Opinion B. This declaration is then 
made public (and thus may act as a prior to attending linked-
neighbors) with a probability that is manipulated between 
systems. For example, a P(Declaration) of 1 means all 
agents will make their opinions public, whilst a 
P(Declaration) of .1 means there is a 10% probability of 
agents making their opinion public. This P(Declaration) 
bears a parallel to Watts and Dodds (2007) “individual 
threshold”, found to impact spreading phenomena. 
Dynamics 
Given the above architecture has been established, 
simulations commence with the initial, neutral “event” 
being witnessed by a portion of the network (based on 
manipulated interconnectivity). These agents (termed 1
st
 
generation) start with a neutral prior, and so, based on the 
stochastic nature of the evidence, half should arrive at each 
opinion post-evaluation. From this point, if an agent of the 
1
st
 generation makes their opinion public (based on 
manipulated P(Declaration)), their attentive (presently 
neutral) linked-neighbors (2
nd
 generation) then take this 
opinion as a prior, and evaluate it according to the procedure 
above. This 2
nd
 generation agents, having come to a 
decision, then similarly each choose whether to make their 
opinion public (based on P(Declaration)), and thus the 3
rd
 
generation is exposed. This process continues until there has 
been no change in the number opinion-holders (of either 
type) for two consecutive time periods (i.e. if no one has 
made an opinion public, and thus the opinions have “died 
out”, or if the network is now completely saturated). 
Importantly, for the proof of concept model, having 
decided upon an opinion, an agent is no longer attentive to 
further information. This is purposeful to prevent cyclical 
effects beyond an initial cascade, as the goal of the present 
paper is to show the susceptibility of interconnected neutral 
agents to an opinion cascade, without resorting to 
explanations of homophily (Dandekar et al., 2013) and 
localized consensus reaching (Ngampruetikorn & Stephens, 
2015). 
For the purpose of the present paper, the behaviors of 
interest are constrained to two, related measures. Firstly, the 
global proportion of opinions across the system (i.e. the 
proportion of agents with Opinion A, and the proportion 
with Opinion B) is of interest before inferring anything 
about localized clustering. For example, whether localized 
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clustering is simply a by-product of a dominant, network-
wide opinion. This leads to the second measure: the average 
percentage of likeminded neighbors an agent possesses. In 
other words, of an agent’s visible network, what percentage 
are in agreement with the agent (e.g., 50% indicates agents 
directly linked to equal proportions of each opinion-type).  
The manipulated variables are summarized in table 1 below: 
 
Table 1. System variables 
 
 
Central Findings 
The above model was implemented in NetLogo (5.2.1). 
Each system specification (Interconnectivity (100) x 
Opinion Strength (3) x P(Declaration) (3)) was run 
independently 100 times, taking an average set of values for 
each specification. The total number of agents in each 
simulation was set to 1000. 
Figs. 1a & 1b show example outcomes of opinion cascades 
(A in red, B in blue) across a sparsely connected (1% 
interconnectivity) and a more densely connected (10% 
interconnectivity) system, respectively. 
  
a   b 
 
Figures 1a and 1b: Sparsely and densely connected 
networks, post cascade (grey represents unused links). 
 
Importantly, as Fig. 2 illustrates, irrespective of opinion 
strength, P(Declaration), or interconnectivity, the global 
proportion of different opinion holders consistently 
approximates 50/50.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of opinion holders across network 
 
 
Figure 3: Degree of Clustering. Calculated as the average 
percentage of like-minded neighbors an agent possesses 
(panels represent P(Declaration) conditions). 
 
The degree of clustering (Fig. 3) can be broken down into 
several key findings. First, and central to the present paper, 
localized clustering increases as a function of decreasing 
interconnectivity and opinion strength, with stronger 
opinions and low interconnectivity (<1%) resulting in the 
local (directly visible) networks of agents consisting of 
>90% likeminded individuals
2
. Second, this effect occurs 
irrespective of the propensity for individuals within the 
network to make their opinions public
3
. In other words, 
whether P(Declaration) is at 100% or 10%, localized 
clustering occurs regardless. 
Finally, localized clustering is mitigated by the degree of 
stochasticity (i.e. as opinion strength moves towards neutral, 
thus having no communicative impact) and increasing 
interconnectivity. However, it is important to note that to 
prevent local clustering requires either no opinion impact or 
moving towards high (and arguably unrealistic) levels of 
interconnectivity.  
Discussion 
The central finding of the present paper is that the 
fundamental way in which networks are constructed, when 
combined with the temporal dynamics of how information 
travels through them, and the cognitive representation of 
opinions as a prior, inherently leads to false consensus 
effects and echo-chambers. Thus, the more deterministic 
peer-to-peer communications are (i.e. how likely is a 
recipient to adopt the opinion of a sender), and the lower the 
relative density of connections within the network, the 
greater the impact of the spatiotemporal order (i.e. the larger 
the cascade sequence) on clustering.
4
 
                                                          
2 Further simulations in which total network size has been 
varied, but density has been kept constant at 1% (i.e. 10 agent-links 
for 1000 agents, 50 links for 5000 agents) have shown clustering 
effects remain constant (i.e. depend on relational, not absolute 
links / network size). 
3 Mathematically, P(Declaration) starts to have an impact when 
it effectively reduces the average number of “functional” links to a 
point below the absolute threshold for a singular cohesive network 
(i.e. if it reduces the average number of active links below 4 in the 
present model; left-hand panel of Fig. 3). 
4 The present model demonstrates this with fixed, neutral (0.5) 
priors for all agents. If variance in priors is included, such that SD 
Variable Description Levels
Interconnectivity (%) (Links per Agent / Total 
Agents in Network) * 100
0.5, 1, 1.5, 
... 50
Opinion Strength Added to (or subtracted from) 
neutral agent prior (P(H) = .5)
0, 0.1, 0.2
P(Declaration) Probability of making opinion 
public
0.1, 0.5, 1
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Critically, this effect occurs prior to any repeated 
interactions between agents, separating the present work 
from opinion dynamic literatures (Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 
2011; Allahverdyan & Galstyan, 2014), and without 
assuming individual differences on the part of agents (e.g., 
differences in susceptibility) or singular information types, 
common to information cascade literatures (Watts, 2002). 
Further, work in these areas including social network 
pruning (Ngampruetikorn & Stephens, 2015) and 
polarization effects (Dandekar et al., 2013; Duggins, 2016), 
when looking at cyclical interactions, illustrate that repeated 
interaction is likely to only exacerbate the already high 
levels of localized clustering. 
False Consensus and Echo-chambers 
The effects described in the present work are found to be 
broadly independent of the propensity to communicate, and 
robust across the degree of interconnectivity (requiring 
approximately 50% interconnective density to negate, 
something unfeasible in online networks approaching 
billions). Putting this into concrete terms, Facebook has an 
estimated 1.79 billion active users
5
. The average (median) 
number of “friends” or links is approximately 2006, meaning 
the average user is connected to .000011% of the overall 
network. To fully negate the effects demonstrated here 
would require either the severance of lateral transmissions 
(or decreasing the deterministic capacity of communications 
sufficiently), or having each user share direct connections 
with approximately 900 million other users. 
The formation of echo-chambers and the polarization of 
opinions is typically attributed to repeated interaction with a 
self-regarding preference (Ngampruetikorn & Stephens, 
2015) or a signaling of like-mindedness (e.g., trust; see Li, 
Scaglione, Swami, & Zhao, 2013). This work instead shows 
that the structure of the network, and the way in which 
opinions emanate across it, are sufficient to result in false 
consensus effects and echo-chambers. To put this in more 
pragmatic terms; regardless of who you know, why you 
know them, or how you have repeatedly interacted / pruned 
your network, the fact that you do not, and arguably cannot 
know enough people, no matter who they are, is sufficient to 
leave you highly susceptible to echo-chambers. 
It should be noted that this proof of concept model carries 
with it several assumptions. Most notably, opinions are 
classified in a binary fashion, so as to replicate the target 
                                                                                                  
> opinion strength, then clustering severity is reduced. However, 
this relies on the strong assumption that there is independence of 
opinions across a self-selecting network. If one incorporates 
instead a degree of dependence in neighbouring opinion-holders, 
then one has in effect shifted echo-chamber formation to precede 
opinion transmission, and have thus “baked-in” the result.  
5 Figure taken from monthly active users as of the 3rd quarter of 
2016. Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-
of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/  
6 Figure taken from Pew Research Center survey of Facebook 
users in 2014. Source: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/  
opinion types under investigation, and associated with echo-
chambers (e.g., referenda, or political campaigns). Future 
work is proposed to incorporate variance as they move 
across a network (i.e. do they dissipate, or become stronger). 
Secondly, agents attend and evaluate based on the first 
exposure to an opinion in their immediate network (i.e. 
those they are directly connected to). Although future work 
is suggested to incorporate the influence of multiple sources 
(e.g., via social conformity), such architecture is initially 
precluded to avoid “baking in” localized clustering effects. 
Finally, the present model assumes a flat hierarchy of 
individuals. Although the argument can be made that fixing 
the level of interconnectivity for all individuals in a network 
is an artificial constraint, in terms of the degree of 
interconnectivity in target systems (e.g., Facebook) the 
functional difference in interconnectivity among users is 
between approximately .000011% (200 friends) and 
.00028% (5000 friends; Facebook user limit). Although 
structural hierarchy, such as media influencers, may have an 
impact on dissemination (along with their own motives, 
such as following pre-existing opinion trends; see 
Quattrociocchi et al., 2014), the present work serves to 
illustrate that localized clustering can result from the 
spatiotemporal order of lateral transmission across a 
network. 
Further Work 
The present work, in serving as a proof of concept for an 
increasingly important phenomenon, and providing some 
initial assumptions to illustrate the effects in a 
straightforward manner, leaves the door open for further, 
more psychologically informed modelling opportunities. 
Further work should start to incorporate additional 
complexity on the part of agent (cognitive) architecture, 
such as the inclusion of social conformity (Latané, 1981), 
which is predicted to increase clustering tendencies (and 
feasibly increase the strength of opinions as they spread 
throughout the system. Similarly, work on confirmation bias 
suggests a similarly exacerbating role (Allahverdyan & 
Galstyan, 2014; Doll et al., 2009; Nickerson, 1998; 
Staudinger & Büchel, 2013). Finally, the inclusion of 
Bayesian models of source credibility (Harris & Hahn, 
2009; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2015; Madsen, 2016) 
are of interest  (Bayesian models of social learning have 
already started being applied to opinion dynamics; see 
Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 2011), given the way in which 
people form networks (i.e. we tend to select those we know / 
trust / like when forming our “direct” network). These 
suggestions are by no means exhaustive, but serve as 
examples of the promising (and readily applied) further 
additions to the framework laid out in the present work. 
The present work purposefully precludes such 
psychological elements, which are expected to exacerbate 
the effects illustrated in this proof of concept model. This 
choice was made both for reasons of parsimony, and to 
provide a demonstration that the effects herein do not rely 
on such processes or explanations. 
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In conclusion, the present paper demonstrates that rational 
agents (i.e. absent special functionality of cognition or 
individual differences), through the way in which online 
networks are structured, are intrinsically susceptible to high 
levels of localized clustering (i.e. echo-chambers) when 
opinions are transmitted laterally. Further, it is hoped that 
the present paper serves as an example of how 
psychological principles taken from the individual level may 
be applied to a societal level through the use of Agent-
Based Models. 
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